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Abstract 
The view that charity consists in an expansion of existing 
interpersonal relations is rather misleading.  We need to 
see it as a radical transformation, of existing relations, even 
if this suspension is only temporary. In charity we see a 
person as someone who is no longer capable of reacting 
appropriately. Someone who is no longer capable of 
behaving as a „person‟ nevertheless continues to be a 
person.  She does not lose her personal sanctity or dignity 
even if she has lost a practical grasp on controlling and 
guiding the course of her life.   
Today we often tend to reduce charity to a compassionate 
form of helping, or aid-giving, such as when materials, 
doctors and psychologists are sent to regions that are torn 
apart by war or famine.  It is much easier to understand 
charity when it can be measured against the reduction of 
physical and emotional distress.  It is much more difficult 
to understand charity in cases where aid proves to be 
powerless, when there is no measurable return or change 
that is brought about. 
While ethics cannot teach us what to do once compassion, 
benevolence and forgiveness fail to make any difference, 
prayer can help us to move forward. Praying for others, 
more specifically, the long-suffering involved in prayer, is 
a particularly important form of charity.  It has the power 
to lift us above our inability to do anything helpful. We 
pray at the very moment when we experience our 
powerlessness to help.  
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This article is a journey through the complex interplay of 
charity, compassion, moral goodness, self-esteem, social 
hierarchy, spirituality and prayer.  
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In her voluminous study, Upheavals of Thought (2001), Martha 
Nussbaum voices a number of thoughts on charity.  She accounts 
for charity, or compassionate love, as a form of mercy or clemency, 
or more specifically, from the point of view of the lenient judge. As 
she writes, “[m]ercy is defined as the inclination of the judgment 
toward leniency in selecting penalties: the merciful judge will often 
choose a penalty milder than the one appointed in law for the 
offense” (p. 365).  Nussbaum‟s interest in charity fits within her 
moral-philosophical plea for greater compassion, a plea that she 
directs against philosophers such as Spinoza, who argue that 
benevolence and humanity should not depend on the vicissitudes 
of compassion. She draws three arguments from Seneca to support 
her idea that charity, in the sense of compassion, is an expression of 
moral goodness. Firstly, mercy is compatible with an aristocratic, 
virile ideal of self-esteem that, contrary to self-humiliation, affirms 
one‟s own power.  It is not a sign of weakness that one is unwilling 
to cause pain; nor does it run contrary to the ideals of aristocratic 
life. Secondly, leniency is grounded in the deeper insight that 
human beings are flawed, vulnerable and frail creatures.  It shows 
little human insight to consider individuals as the bearers of beauty 
and goodness alone. A lack of leniency is therefore incompatible 
with true love, for compassion accepts the other in his or her frailty. 
Thirdly, compassion fosters and nourishes the life of the 
community.  Thanks to compassion – and this is still according to 
Nussbaum – the other is not simply cast away or expelled from the 
community. Leniency therefore contributes to the restoration of 
bonds between friends and neighbors, for example, or between 
parents and their children. Moreover, compassion can create new 
forms of solidarity as well.  The more people practice compassion, 
the more the community benefits from it. Compassion is altruism 
carried out in the service of social life.  As Nussbaum argues, it is 
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an attitude that bears in mind how a community is not supported 
and shaped by rights and duties alone, but also by generosity.  
There is no generosity without the law, but as generosity cannot be 
enforced by the law, it refers to a beyond of the law.  While others 
can certainly evaluate and size up your acts of generosity and 
compassion, they can never point their finger at you for lacking in 
compassion. 
In my remarks here, the following two claims of Nussbaum will be 
important: firstly, that compassion ought to be understood in terms 
of leniency or clemency, and secondly, that its value consists chiefly 
in fostering and restoring communal life.  I assume that, by and large, 
there will be little disagreement concerning these two claims. In my 
account here, however, I will argue that the attitude of the lenient 
judge, on the one hand, and the wellbeing of the community, on the 
other, fail to put charity in the right perspective. Leniency fails to 
express the inner core of charity, and the analysis of the relation 
between compassion and the community is misleading.  Don‟t get 
me wrong: charitable compassion is a form of altruism – I am not 
calling this into question.  But this does not necessarily imply, as 
Nussbaum would have it, that this particular kind of altruism is in 
the service of the community.  The effects on the community are 
secondary, as I would like to argue. 
To get a better picture of charitable love, I find myself inspired by 
what has long been called, in the Christian tradition, the fourteen 
deeds of charity, which are found in Thomas Aquinas‟ Summa 
Theologiae 2a 2ae. [Thomas uses the term eleemosynae]. The physical 
deeds of charity are feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, 
clothing the naked, harboring the foreigner, visiting the sick and 
the prisoner and burying the dead. The spiritual deeds are teaching 
the ignorant, counselling those in doubt, consoling the afflicted, 
admonishing the sinner, bearing with patience those who are 
troublesome and burdensome, forgiving those who insult you, and 
praying for all, the living as well as the dead.  Though this double 
list does not serve to explain what charity is, it does offer guiding 
examples of how a compassionate person acts in certain 
circumstances. 
In Christian spirituality, this list of charitable deeds is also meant to 
function as a practical guide, or illustration, of how one ought to 




interpret and carry out the command to love one‟s neighbor. It is a 
fact that the command to love one‟s neighbor as oneself is not 
found in the Christian tradition alone. Not only was it already 
present in the Old Testament, but it plays a significant role in many 
other great spiritual traditions as well.  What sets Christian 
neighborly love apart as somewhat peculiar, if not as a form of 
pure and simple anarchy, is one particular formulation of it, 
namely, to love your enemies.  This is the most counter-natural 
demand that has ever been laid upon human shoulders. It lacks any 
possible natural foundation. According to a naturalistic 
understanding of our moral sensibility, pleasure and pain prefigure 
what is good and bad. They are not only spontaneous expressions 
of good and bad – they also function as reliable guides to follow. 
They are natural expressions of love and hate in the sense that our 
bodies love what is good, insofar as it is pleasurable, and they hate 
what is bad and what brings harm to our bodies. To love my 
enemy is to embrace someone who does violence to me and to what 
is most precious to me.  This attitude goes directly against any 
natural tendency and is impossible to carry out without redirecting 
the aggression that you bear towards your enemy against yourself. 
Christianity is aware of the shocking character of this command 
and recognizes that it is a thorn in the flesh, a stumbling block or a 
kind of moral madness that conflicts with the ideals of justice and 
equity.  Criminals need to be punished, not to be loved.  It is quite 
understandable that both Nietzsche and Freud claimed that, with 
this command, Christianity implanted an infinite guilt right into 
the very heart of our moral sensibility.  There is no correct 
understanding of this command without the knowledge that it is 
shocking, counterintuitive and cruel.  Whatever you do, it is never 
enough.  And that you didn‟t do more than you did can only be 
your fault, for the command doesn‟t forbid you anything. 
It is important to point out that Thomas‟ list of fourteen charitable 
deeds does not approach the theme of neighborly love from the 
question of who my neighbor is.  The neighbor is nowhere defined 
with respect to relations based on friendship, family, race, nation or 
shared belief, for instance.  The existing relations don‟t function as 
a reference point for identifying your neighbor. The list rather 
shows what it means to be a neighbor to someone.  The person to 
whom you are compassionate, toward whom you are neighborly, is 
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not the one called „neighbor‟. You are the neighbor to whom you 
are merciful – not the other way around.  This perspective 
corresponds to the parable of the Good Samaritan. At the end of 
telling his parable Christ asks: “Which of the three was, according 
to you, the neighbor of the victim of the robbers”. 
Let us return to the double list.  The list makes immediately clear 
why the leniency of the judge is much too meager an image to 
properly figure the complexity of charity.  To bury the dead, for 
example, cannot be seen as a form of clemency or compassion.  But 
there is also a more sophisticated reason for drawing your attention 
to this particular charitable gesture.  The ontological condition of a 
dead body, or corpse, offers a striking picture of the ontological 
condition of the living person who is in need and who appeals to 
my charity.  Both the dead body and the living person in need 
occupy an ambiguous [ontological] „in-between‟ position, at once 
inside and outside the social framework.  To understand burying 
the dead as a paradigm of the work of charity clarifies why charity 
cannot be reduced to, or understood solely in terms of, its beneficial 
social impact.  To my mind, it is not leniency but patience that 
constitutes the hard kernel of charitable love.  Another word for 
this patience is longsuffering.  Charity is a longsuffering love.  
What charity suffers is a community‟s inability to be healed or 
restored, its internal rupture.  It stands in the gap of a tear in the 
community‟s social fabric and accepts that the gap, or the wound, 
between me and my neighbor, cannot be healed.  In the second part 
of my paper I will explain this view on charity in more detail.  And 
in my conclusion, I will suggest in which sense patience, or 
longsuffering, can draw our attention to the spiritual dimension of 
charity.  
But first – why is burying the dead so instructive, or so clear an 
illustration, of charity? 
1. To bury the dead: a work of charity? 
It is clear why this specific deed of charity does not fit particularly 
well within Nussbaum‟s view of things: neither clemency nor 
compassion enter into the motive for burying the dead.  The 
reference to this particular deed is philosophically instructive 




insofar as it questions our frequent tendency to reduce any and 
every kind of altruism to benevolence, to the diminishing of pain 
and suffering in the world or assisting a person in need.  A corpse 
has no need of assistance; unlike a person in need, a corpse does 
not suffer any more for their trouble.  Of course, from a certain 
angle, you could argue that the act of burying the dead could be re-
inserted into a larger altruistic cycle, or a higher, derivative need.  
You could say, for example, that you are diminishing the pain of 
the relatives and those who survive the dead.  This argument is not 
very convincing, however, since it leads our attention away from 
the fact that, in the first instance, you are „helping‟ the corpse as 
such.  
This particular deed is not the only one that jars our usual 
understanding of charity as benevolence, as assisting the needy or 
relieving suffering. Suffering can affect both body and mind: there 
is physical suffering, and then there is mental suffering.  If we 
retrace the list of the spiritual deeds of charity, we notice that it 
refers to deeds that cannot be reduced to an altruistic diminishing 
of mental suffering, or spiritual aid.  Some of them would even 
seem to have nothing to do with suffering of any sort.  Take for 
example the act of bearing with the troublesome and obnoxious 
qualities of a person‟s character. A person with a difficult character 
does not necessarily suffer from his bad character – [on the 
contrary, it‟s everyone else who has to suffer in one way or another]. 
And what about praying? One [often hears reports of statistical 
studies confirming the beneficial effects of prayer on the recovery 
of those suffering injuries and illness. Is this what makes prayer an 
act of charity, a scientific understanding of its potential effects?]  At 
its root, neighborly, charitable prayer is a fundamentally symbolic 
gesture that cannot be measured up against any efficacy it may or 
may not have in aiding a person in need.   
Do any of these remarks imply that we need to sever the link 
between charity and aid, or compassion?  That is not necessarily 
the case, but it does incite us to pay closer attention to the deeper 
meaning of assisting a person who suffers.  In what sense? 
Helpfulness, or the willingness to help, is associated with servitude 
and subordination: a person who is subservient makes himself 
subordinate to the other.  This involves the basic attitudes of 
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reverence, awe and respect.  This reminds us of the deeper spiritual 
meaning at work in burying the dead, or in any other act of 
charitable service: burial is a final act of showing respect to and 
honoring the dead.  Instead of servicing the dead man‟s needs, I 
serve his or her honor and dignity as a human being. 
In honoring a man, or his dead body, we recognize that a person 
occupies a special place within the world.  What this involves is an 
affirmation, carried to the extreme, of the ontological difference 
between man and other living creatures, such as animals and 
plants: out of respect, we affirm and re-affirm this difference, 
especially in those cases in which the difference is no longer 
evident, or when it is on the point of vanishing.  This is precisely 
what happens when someone dies.  Directly following death, the 
human face of the deceased is still clearly recognizable on his 
corpse, but it does not take very long before this recognizable shape 
disappears and dissolves away.  In death, the observable 
differences between man, animals and lifeless matter disappear.  
And it is precisely there where this difference dissolves – or where 
it is annihilated by the cruel indifference of nature – that we re-
emphasize it by making a symbolic gesture, such as a burial.  We 
re-affirm the difference by covering the dead body with pure, white 
sand, with a blameless sheet, or by cremating it.  In this way, we 
take the human body into protection from everything that might 
obliterate the unique value of the human being; we guard this 
value from everything that might negate the radical difference.  To 
put it somewhat differently, we protect the deceased person from a 
descent into nothingness, from the anonymous and impersonal 
forces of nature that would negate his value and level the unique 
place that he held in the world.  By honoring the deceased‟s body – 
or by serving the honor of the man – we do for his body what it can 
no longer do for itself: we bestow honor upon it at the very 
moment that it loses any sense of honor and dignity.  But should 
we not recognize the same meaning, or the same sensitivity to the 
other‟s dignity, in the clothing of the naked and other acts of 
charity?  To clothe the naked is to respect the dignity of the body, 
even if, at the same time, it also serves the bodies‟ needs for 
protection from cold and physical harm.  While the anonymous 
powers of nature, such as cold, thirst and hunger, threaten to 
dishonor human existence, by our physical deeds of charity, we 




restore and re-affirm the body‟s dignity.  Ultimately, charity serves 
to restore dignity to those suffering under degrading and inhuman 
circumstances.  While helping a person in need alleviates his or her 
suffering, the deeper metaphysical motive underlying this 
assistance is this restoration of human dignity. We strive to alleviate 
suffering because it undermines this dignity.  Nussbaum‟s account 
fails to appreciate this deeper aspect underlying acts of charitable 
love, for in her emphasis on mercy and benevolence, she fails to 
explore the deeper motives behind charitable actions. 
From a phenomenological point of view, a dead body occupies the 
position of an ontological „in-between‟, as Agamben would have it.  
It no longer belongs to life and yet it is not yet pure and simple 
lifeless matter either.  The body of a dead person still resembles the 
living being that it once was, and yet at the same time, it no longer 
belongs to the world of the living. Though it no longer participates 
in the world of shared human meaning, it does not simply drop out 
of this world either.  According to the phenomenology of Freud, 
the dead body is an uncanny presence, a presence without a proper 
place: neither is it „still here among us‟, nor is it simply „dead and 
gone‟. It falls both inside and outside our world as a disorienting 
and uncanny presence: it bears an excess that makes it impossible 
to reduce to the level of mere lifeless matter, and yet, at the same 
time, it no longer belongs among the living.  The charitable act of 
burial consists in a recognition of the dead body‟s peculiar 
ontological condition with respect to the community.  
This peculiar ontological condition casts light upon the human 
condition as such.  But in what sense, precisely?  Human beings 
belong to two worlds at once.  We both share a world with each 
other and, as individuals, we fall beyond the reach of what we 
share in common. We are both members of a community and 
beings with no membership. We are all beings without a home, 
without a land – beings without being. This is what contributes to 
our sense of loneliness and isolation even when we live together in 
a world of shared meanings. There is a fundamental loneliness 
inherent in our existence, a loneliness that can never fully be 
reduced by communication, interaction, socialization or care. This 
loneliness explains why no human being ever fully falls together 
with his membership to a larger social group.  The dead body 
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reminds us of this deeper loneliness.  It makes this hidden solitude 
visible to us by showing how we fall outside the scope of the world 
to which we belong, as if we didn‟t have a proper place, or as if 
each of us lived in an inhospitable gap that were both inside and 
beyond the larger community. Nussbaum‟s account fails to situate 
charity within this broader metaphysical perspective on the human 
condition.  
Though this notion of being „in-between‟ gives expression to our 
human condition, in ordinary circumstances, this insight is far from 
being dominant.  It remains in the background, passing us by and 
vanishing the very moment that it emerges.  It is ultimately this 
aspect of our being-human – and not a need, pure and simple – that 
brutally comes to the fore when someone appeals to my charity.  
My neighbor calls out to me from that beyond where he or she 
belongs to nothing and to no one.  My charity is aroused by the 
pitiable and miserable loneliness of the human condition that 
manifests itself before me.  It is not necessary to understand this 
„beyond‟ that I am referring to as a deeper richness or a hidden 
reality.  On the contrary, what it marks is our simple and radical 
incapacity to be deeply and fully engaged in the world we share 
together.  This brings me back to the theme of patience and 
longsuffering, or what I call the hard kernel of the charitable 
attitude. 
2. Spiritual deeds of charity 
Charity is often presented as an expansion upon already existing 
forms of social interaction, or as a radicalization of what we already 
do for others.  But in what sense are we to understand this 
expanding movement?  The notion of expansion implies an 
enlargement of the social circle in which we carry out acts of 
benevolence and compassion.  What we are already willing to do 
for our children, family and friends, or for our fellow citizens, we 
need to do for others, or for those who do not belong to these 
circles. This view identifies charity with a love for humankind as a 
whole.  The basic presupposition of this view is that existing 
interpersonal relations – our relations to children and family, for 
instance – are already shaped by charity, or that they can already 
be seen as charitable relations.  To put it somewhat differently, in 




this view, charity is not radically different in any way from the 
spontaneous and natural attitude of benevolence that we already 
show to others.  Indeed, the parable of the Good Samaritan is often 
explained in this way: we need to broaden the scope of our 
benevolence to those who don‟t belong to our community. 
While it is undoubtedly true that we need to be charitable towards 
those who fall outside our circle of familiarity, the simple idea that 
we need to widen the scope of our altruism doesn‟t really clarify 
that much in the end. Why not? The idea that deeds of charity 
expand upon what is already going on in our interpersonal 
relations wrongly suggests that these relations themselves already 
belong under the category of „charity‟. It is only in very specific 
circumstances that people make appeal on my charity. The view 
that charity consists in an expansion of existing interpersonal 
relations is therefore rather misleading.  Instead of understanding 
charity in this way, we need to see it as a radical transformation, or 
suspension, of existing interpersonal relations, even if this 
suspension is only temporary in nature. 
In order to seize hold of this point, we need to distinguish between 
two different concepts of personhood, one of which is metaphysical 
in nature, the other practical.  The metaphysical notion of 
personhood, which Kant and Gaita call the sanctity of the person, 
refers to the dignity that a person bears regardless of her personal 
qualities and capacities, of her membership to a given social group, 
or of her geographical origins and genealogy. The ontological fact 
that you belong to the human species makes you the bearer of an 
inalienable dignity.  The practical notion of personhood, on the 
other hand, refers to a personal capacity to understand human 
meanings and values in an appropriate manner, that is, with 
respect to the way that people are supposed and expected to act and 
react in certain circumstances.  Someone who, due to a severe 
disability, is no longer capable of performing deliberate, conscious 
actions, or behaving as a „person‟, nevertheless continues to be a 
person in the metaphysical sense.  She does not lose her personal 
sanctity, or dignity, even if she has lost a practical grasp on 
controlling and guiding the course of her life, or of being 
responsible for her actions.  What I have in mind with this practical 
notion of personhood corresponds to what Strawson has called, in 
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his Freedom and Ressentiment, the capability to perform „reactive 
attitudes‟.  What reactive attitudes involve is the supposition that a 
person is capable of being responsible for his behavior, that he is 
sensitive to and understands the complex play of motivations and 
intentions guiding human behavior.  To be a person in the practical 
sense requires that you care about the judgment of others, that you 
are affected by pride and shame, that you understand the practical 
significance of guilt, responsibility, repentance, forgiveness and so 
forth.  In the end, it is quite difficult to give a precise definition of 
these interpersonal, reactive attitudes, and I will not do so here, for 
practical notions of personhood can be found in a wide variety of 
forms in many different cultures, and can vary geographically. For 
our purposes here, let it suffice to understand this practical sense of 
personhood both as a moral sensitivity to the values and 
motivations guiding human action and a basis of personal moral 
responsibility. 
Certain examples help clarify what is at stake in the practical notion 
of personhood.  If you assist a person in need, for instance, you are 
right to expect that he or she will be grateful to you.  These sorts of 
expectations are formed in large part by socialization, such as when 
we teach a child to be grateful and how to properly express his 
gratitude.  Similarly, we encourage people affected by adversity to 
conduct themselves with dignity.  A person is blamed and 
reproved when she behaves „incorrectly‟ in response to adversity; 
we assume that she can understand why the action she takes is 
wrong, why certain excuses are appropriate in some circumstances 
while inappropriate in others.  Underlying these sorts of practical 
considerations is the assumption that people generally care about 
what others think about them and about their actions.  
 
Charity, on my view, is practiced at the very moment when a 
person, for whatever reason, is no longer capable of reacting 
appropriately, or of fully participating in the interpersonal space of 
shared human meanings and values.  It is wrong to begin by asking 
the question of who my neighbor is, who it is that demands my 
charity.  The first question that needs to be asked is rather: what are 
the circumstances under which a person becomes the object of my 
pity, or charity.  And how do these circumstances differ from those 




that condition my normal or more usual way of acting and relating 
to others?  As I would like to argue, charity begins there where I 
effect a radical alteration to, or suspension of, my attitude toward 
others – not where I simply expand or enlarge upon this attitude. 
We will see in a moment what this transformation consists in and 
what it means.  For the time-being I would simply like to 
emphasize that charity involves more than simply doing something 
for a person or helping her in some way or another; more than that, 
it is inextricably bound to an abandonment of the spontaneous 
attitude that we bear with relation to others, an abandonment that 
nevertheless holds back from fully severing itself off from its 
spontaneous attitude.  What it involves is a suspension, however 
temporary, of our practical sensitivity to „personhood‟ and the 
needs of others – not an expansion thereof. 
[Charity starts with the necessity to give up our spontaneous 
demand that a person reacts as a person. To help a person in need 
is an act of charity/compassion at the very moment that the person 
in distress is no longer capable of reacting appropriately to the aid 
he/she receives.  In charity we see a person as someone who is no 
longer capable of reacting appropriately. Basically, charity is all 
about interrupting, suspending and postponing the usual or 
habitual forms of interacting with each other. Charity is not an 
expansion (enlargement) of the existing forms of inter-subjectivity, 
but a transformation/modification of them. The modification also 
exists in an interruption (suspension) of our spontaneous 
expressions of altruism and benevolence.] 
It should be clear how this understanding of charity falls right in 
line with what we discussed earlier concerning burying the dead.  
The person toward whom you are charitable – in this case a dead 
body, or a „person‟ lacking any sense of practical personhood – falls 
both within and beyond the reach of our normal, socialized, 
interpersonal relations.  Charity acts based on the insight that the 
person in need is at least temporally inaccessible as a person, as if 
the practical notion of personhood had lost its grip on him or her.  
As long as a person is actually engaged in the practical field of 
human meanings and appropriately responds to these meanings, 
charity cannot and need not come into play.  Charity is not a plea 
for more openness or sensitivity to the conditions that make the 
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person different or socially inaccessible; no, it arises from the 
insight that the other can no longer take part in interpersonal 
interaction.  What causes someone to fall beyond the reach of 
interpersonal reactive attitudes is his human misery, his poverty, 
his incapability to fully participate as a person to the demands of 
life.  The hard kernel of the charitable attitude is to bear with this 
poverty and incapability, just as Christ bears witness in his prayer 
on the cross: “Father, forgive them for they don‟t know what they 
are doing” (Luke 23:34).  
It is a mistake to understand charity as involving a constraint on 
our egoism, for what needs to be constrained in charitable love is 
not so much our egoism as the spontaneous reactive attitudes that 
frame and organize our relations to others.  I behave with cruelty 
when, in performing an apparently charitable action, I cannot stop 
myself from exhorting the other to react in certain ways, to behave 
as a responsible moral agent, or as other persons do.  Why is it so 
difficult to abandon these attitudes of moral encouragement, 
exhortation, incitement and so on?  The answer: because reactive 
attitudes constitute what it means to be, to live and to act as a 
person.  Charity, in contrast, moves in a sort of in-between, between the 
demands that we place upon the other to react as a person and the 
suspension, or temporary neutralization, of these demands. 
It is easy to see how this notion of charity as a suspension of the 
normal, interpersonal reactive attitudes hangs together with the 
practice of patience or longsuffering.  Charity is a patience that bears 
with the transcendence of a person.  (This definition goes back, of 
course, to Paul, who, in 1 Cor. 13: 4, writes that love is patient and 
kind, that it is not boastful or arrogant).  One important 
consequence of my clarification of charity is that actions such as 
teaching the ignorant, consoling the distressed and advising those 
in doubt cannot, in and of themselves, be seen as deeds of charity.  
On the contrary, these are actions that we carry out spontaneously; 
they are the basic equipment with which we relate to and recognize 
each other as persons, in the practical sense of the term.  What is it, 
then, that transforms these actions into deeds of charity? 
 
 Counselling those in doubt becomes a deed of charity when 
the doubter gets trapped, or stuck, within her indecisive 




attitude; when she, despite her openness to and explicit 
demand for advice, cannot pay heed to any advice 
whatsoever.  Insofar as she asks for advice, she falls within 
interpersonal relations, but because she remains captive to 
her lack of resolution, she falls outside these relations at the 
same time.  Every bit of counsel she receives „falls on deaf 
ears‟, as we say.  She becomes the object of my charity 
precisely when this deafness falls upon her, when she finds 
herself withdrawn and closed off from the advice she is 
nevertheless desperately seeking out.  Charity, in this 
instance, consists in enduring with the hopeless lack of 
resolution of those in need of counsel.  
 Take next the act of consoling those in distress.  This becomes 
a work of charity at the very moment when, in spite of a 
person‟s demand for and desperate need of consolation, she 
remains totally impervious to consoling words and 
gestures.  I become a neighbor to her at the very moment 
when she becomes a captive of her inconsolability and 
when I, in turn, am forced to bear with my powerlessness to 
console her. 
 Or take yet another example, the forgiveness of offenses.  
Without further conditions, I would hesitate to call this a 
work of charity.  To forgive an offense is not a charitable act, 
if, for example, the forgiveness comes as a response to the 
other‟s sincere expression of regret.  Both repentance and 
forgiveness belong to our spontaneous moral attitudes.  
Forgiveness only becomes charity when it takes the shape of 
a simple, longsuffering bearing-with, when one endures the 
offense as such.  Here my view no doubt deviates 
somewhat from Christian tradition, for in my view, charity 
does not involve a willingness to forgive ever greater 
offenses, or a continual turning of the other cheek.  In my 
view, charity consists much less in forgiving the 
unforgiveable as in enduring the fact that we cannot forgive 
everything.  Instead of necessarily seeking out the 
restoration of the community, it endures the pain that has 
been caused to the community by what cannot be forgiven.  
Charity accepts the fact that the community will never be 
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fully free of strife and division, that the community can be 
touched by wounds that cannot be healed, by sins that 
cannot be forgiven. 
There are extreme circumstances in which we have to accept the 
fact that we can no longer help a person, in which nothing we do 
can ameliorate the delicate „in-between‟ situation in which the 
other finds herself.  These are circumstances in which we run up 
against a radical limit to our benevolence and compassion, when 
the properly charitable dimension of forgiveness reveals itself its 
powerlessness.  Though these might be rather rare and exceptional 
circumstances, it is nevertheless instructive to reflect on charity in 
light of them.  
What can charity do in these extreme conditions?  The answer 
seems rather obvious: the only thing charity can do is to endure 
with longsuffering, to bear with the fact that consolation (or 
forgiveness) can no longer help.  Today we often tend to reduce 
charity to a compassionate form of helping, or aid-giving, such as 
when materials, doctors and psychologists are sent to regions that 
are torn apart by war or famine.  The reason for this is that it is 
much easier to understand charity when it can be measured against 
the reduction of physical and emotional distress suffered by those 
to whom aid is directed.  It is much more difficult to understand 
charity in cases where aid proves to be powerless, when there is no 
measurable return or change that is brought about, such as we saw 
in the examples from a moment ago.  But is there still something 
that we might be able do in these sorts of cases?  Is there something 
else we could do beyond merely accepting the irremediable aspects 
of the situation and bearing with them? In short, is there something 
else at work in charity beyond the practice of a long-suffering 
patience?  
 
From a secular point of view that identifies charity with aid, to 
practice a long-suffering attitude would seem to be the only course 
of action left open.  By reflecting on the nature of prayer as a form 
of spiritual labor, however, we should be able to open up another 
perspective, a perspective that remains hidden when charity is 
approached in ethical and moral terms alone.  By turning to prayer, 




we should be able to see that charity involves something more than 
merely bearing-with its own powerlessness. 
3.  Praying: A Gesture of Charity 
Reflection on prayer takes us into the metaphysical and spiritual 
heart of charity.  In social life, we spontaneously approach and 
relate to each other as being open towards the good, or as being 
accessible to the light of goodness.  In a similar way, we 
instinctively hold each other accountable for our actions.  We 
cannot abandon questions concerning the guilt and responsibility 
that we bear for our actions without going against our moral 
nature.  Attitudes relating to the question of personal responsibility 
and guilt form the hard core of our moral life – the question itself is 
constitutive of what it means for us to be moral agents. Usually, we 
don‟t pay attention to this a priori structure of our moral sensibility.  
We only become aware of this attitude, which silently guides and 
shapes our moral life, when we notice someone who is no longer 
capable of sharing in it.  We already know what these 
circumstances are: circumstances in which feelings of pride and 
shame lose their grip on a person, when consoling words reveal 
their powerlessness, or when, in spite of our encouragement and 
admonishment, a person remains clouded in doubt and fails to act.  
Confronted with these sorts of situations, we cannot help asking 
who is responsible for them, who is responsible for the break, 
rupture or failure.  Whose fault is it that a person can no longer be 
affected by the good?  Involuntarily, a desperate search for 
responsibility and guilt takes over in us.  Our demand to 
understand, or somehow to reconcile the situation, imposes itself 
on us as we bump up unexpectedly against the limits of the good.  
There aren‟t very many answers or solutions to be given here.  
Either we take the person who is closed off from the good as being 
responsible, and if need be, we compel him in one way or another 
to behave as person, to take responsibility for himself and so on. Or 
we accuse ourselves: „I have to be still more forgiving, more 
benevolent, more in tune with the other‟s suffering.‟  It is hard to 
make peace with the fact that, ultimately, no one bears 
responsibility. Our moral sensibility doesn‟t allow us to free 
ourselves so easily from this perspective.  As a result, we 
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continually shift back and forth between blaming ourselves and 
blaming the other, between redoubling our efforts, on the one 
hand, and discounting our failures with a good measure of the 
other‟s guilt, on the other hand.  
It is a moral shock to run up against the limits of the good and the 
useful, or the helpful. It is shocking to discover that goodness is 
limited and cannot penetrate everywhere. As we run up against 
these limits, we encounter a violent resistance welling up from the 
moral perspective that is made inoperative, or that is thereby put 
out of action. This is a violence coming from ethics as such, a sort of 
stubborn, impotent rage that cannot tolerate the limited power of 
the good.  Charity exhorts us to lay down the weapons of this 
violence and inspires us to patience and longsuffering, to an 
attitude that occupies the uncomfortable limit-position between 
doing something and not doing anything, or between activity and 
passivity. In this sense, we can say that charity neutralizes what is 
essential to ethics, or that, with charity, we move beyond of our basic 
moral categories. Longsuffering patience is in-between passivity and 
activity. It is not pure and simple indifference, because it deplores 
the limits against which the good bumps up; and yet, at the same 
time, it restrains itself from any form of therapeutic or charitable 
„forcing‟ that would attempt to overcome these limits. In this new 
attitude, which only comes into the foreground when our moral 
categories are rendered inoperative, the other appears in a new 
light, namely as someone who is both responsible and not 
responsible.  Insofar as charity suspends ethics, it is more generous, 
tender and lenient than ethics. At the same time, however, it is also 
more cruel than ethics, for the patience that it demands is rooted in 
an insight of the limits of the good. 
 
But when charity brings us to rise above our spontaneous moral 
attitude, how do we know what we need to do in this self-
transcending movement? Does our moral practice know how to act 
once our basic categories have been neutralized?  Does it teach us 
what to do when we run up against the limits of our actions?  
Allow me to put it somewhat differently. We have all learned that 
we need to help those in need and to forgive those who wrong us, 
but do we know what to do when we run up against the limits of 




compassion and forgiveness?  Do we need to further strengthen 
our will to help others, to blame either them or ourselves when this 
strengthening comes to grief? Or do we need to neutralize such 
efforts and accept such limitations?  Is this the only alternative: 
either to persevere, almost out of sheer stubbornness, or to accept 
our finitude? 
Spirituality teaches us that there is a third alternative, namely 
prayer. Praying for others and, more specifically, the long-suffering 
involved in prayer, is a particularly important form of charity.  It 
has the power to lift us above our inability to do anything helpful. 
We pray at the very moment when we experience our 
powerlessness to help.  While ethics cannot teach us what to do 
once compassion, benevolence and forgiveness fail to make any 
difference, prayer can help us to move forward. Through prayer, 
we ask for the very help that we, finite as we are, cannot offer 
anymore. This is aid that we ourselves are incapable of offering, an 
aid that must come from elsewhere, namely, from God‟s charity. In 
praying, we ask God to do for the person in need what we 
ourselves are powerless to do, limited as we are. Prayer thus 
involves more than an attitude of long-suffering patience, for in it, 
we do something for the person in need at the very moment that 
we no longer know what to do.  In the practice of spiritual patience, 
which charitable acts such as prayer exercise, the three basic 
Christian virtues come together: infinite hope, faith and love.  
